ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
For years, the focus of how international human rights standards should govern forensic psychology has been organized around psychology's impact on and response to prisoner abuse at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.
1 That focus has not been substantially changed as discussions and debates on that issue show no sign of abating. 2 In contrast, scant attention has been paid to potential international human rights violations of persons with mental or intellectual disabilities at forensic institutions, 3 and this silence of organized forensic psychology facing this mistreatment is equally disturbing. In light of the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD"), 4 the problem is more pointed that organized forensic psychology still largely remains silent about how this significant Convention demands rethinking the humanitarian principles that must control the ways we seek to institutionalize persons around the world. 5 In reality, circumstances in many parts of the world are bleak: services are provided in segregated settings that cut people off from society, often for life; 6 persons are arbitrarily detained from society and [VOL. 17 :79 committed to institutions without any modicum of due process; 7 individuals are denied the ability to make choices about their lives when they are put under plenary guardianship, also often known as "civil death"; 8 there is a wide-spread denial of appropriate medical care or basic hygiene in psychiatric facilities, 9 individuals are subject to powerful and often dangerous psychotropic medications without adequate standards, 10 and there is almost no human rights oversight or enforcement mechanisms to protect against the broad range of institutional abuse. 11 Although there is a robust literature developing-mostly in Australia and New Zealand-on how such institutional conditions violate the international human rights of this population, 12 organized forensic psychology has virtually been silent about these abuses in the United States. This article will first briefly introduce the controversy enveloped in organized psychology for the past fifteen years. Part I discusses the relevant international human rights law that applies to violations against persons with mental and intellectual disabilities. Part II examines the current state of conditions in mental health institutions worldwide. Part III argues why forensic psychology needs to become more aggressively involved in countering international human rights violations at these institutions. Part IV explains the significance of understanding sanism and pretextuality in dealing with the underlying presumptions of forensic psychologists' behaviors and explains how the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence can ameliorate the situation. Part V concludes the article by advocating for changes in forensic psychology to embrace international human rights mandates.
The The attention to behavioral standards of forensic psychologists and forensic psychiatrists has been rising dramatically in recent years. This new attention mostly flows from revelations of the Bush Administration's sanctioning torture at prison camps in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. 19 This led to a spirited debate on the application of international human rights to what some psychologists and psychiatrists have done in the context of armed conflict. In the words of Kenneth Pope, in his recent "Member of the Year" address to the Canadian Psychological Association: "the torture controversy and the choices that led up to it provide a grim inventory of guild ethics, willful ignorance, denial, and discrediting critics." 20 The American Psychological Association's ("APA") failure to mandate that psychologists adhere to international human rights standards 21 has been sharply criticized. 22 Among these critics is the NGO Physicians for Human Rights ("PHR"). "PHR was founded on the idea that physicians, scientists, and other health professionals possess unique skills that lend significant credibility to the investigation and documentation of human rights abuses [ It is important to underscore that "torture" goes beyond prototypical notions of physical abuse and includes psychological abuse as well. 27 In this context, it is also important to note in some jurisdictions-especially, but not solely, in Eastern and Central Europe and China, and some in the United States-the existence of a sorry and shoddy history of mental health professionals complying with governmental officials seeking to suppress political dissenters. 28 So this should not be seen as merely a one-time aberration.
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This all leads to a critical question: should international human rights law only function to prevent politically motivated torture in forensic psychology and forensic psychiatry, or should international human rights law have a boarder mandate that governs forensic psychologists and psychiatrists' general behaviors in all contexts?
I speak often to psychiatrists, psychologists, and criminologists about international human rights law and its relationship to mental disability law, visited Oct. 20, 2017 Why is this? The reason may be as benignly simple as the fragmentation of scholarly research agendas (that, simply, different cohorts of scholars have chosen to write about the different aspects of this connection), an explanation that appears to be supported by the astonishing paucity of available legal literature in this area. Or, perhaps it is as darkly complex as the reality that this topic is just not of much interest to the main cohorts of individuals whom we most logically might expect to embrace it: international human rights activists, academically-focused forensic psychologists and forensic psychiatrists, and mental disability law scholars. In this context, it is necessary to recall that it was not until January 2002 that Amnesty International acknowledged, albeit grudgingly, that violations of international human rights law in the cases of persons institutionalized in psychiatric facilities were international human rights violations. forced to conclude that the question at the heart of this article-the relationship between international human rights standards and the institutional work of forensic psychologists and forensic psychiatrists (especially, but certainly not exclusively, the work that takes place in the psychiatric institutions of civil law nations)-is one that is essentially ignored by academics, both as a topic of scholarly discourse, and as a topic of classroom study.
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I find this pathetic. I also find it baffling, given the shameful history of human rights abuses in psychiatric institutions on every continent. 33 A series of reports issued over the past twenty years by Mental Disabilities Rights International ("MDRI," now Disabilities Rights International, "DRI") and the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre ("MDAC") excoriating the governments of numerous Central and Eastern European and Central and South American nations 34 have drawn scholars and policymakers to these issues, 35 and have even had an impact on the political process of European Union accession. 36 Furthermore, there has even been some So, ignorance on the part of forensic mental health professionals can no longer be-if it ever were-an acceptable excuse. Moreover, I expect that the widespread professional disregard of this issue depressingly and banally results from what I call sanism and pretextuality. 38 This, though, does not solve the problem; it merely identifies the cause. And we will blind ourselves if we fail to acknowledge the ways that sanism and pretextuality have served as potent counterweights to the application of human rights law to all institutional mental disability law.
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B. The meaning of human rights
What are human rights? 40 The University of Minnesota-based Human Rights Resource Center provides a simple definition: "[h]uman rights are the rights a person has simply because he or she is a human being." 41 In its Preamble, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 42 The World Health Organization adds to the description by stating that human rights consist of the basic entitlement accorded to PERLIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 867. These practices were subsequently decried by a member of the European Parliament who demanded abandonment of the use of such beds as a prerequisite for the Czech Republic's admission to the European Union. every human being. These rights include the right to health, education, shelter, employment, property, food, freedom of expression, and movement. 43 Consider the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD"). 44 The CRPD "is regarded as having finally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection." 45 This Convention is the most revolutionary international human rights document ever applied to persons with disabilities. 46 The CRPD furthers the human rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in almost every aspect of life. 47 It firmly endorses a social model of disability, which is a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law.
48 "The Convention responds to traditional models, situates disability within a social model framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities."
49 It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health of civilized conduct'," 73 and highlight the dire need for intervention on behalf of those with a mental disability who are subjected to such treatment. This marginalized and often forgotten population continues to be neglected by the very individuals who should be working the most assiduously to end such injustices. 74 In some parts of the world, these conditions are fatalistically accepted. By way of example, there is a belief that "the right of a psychiatric patient to receive modern treatment to alleviate suffering is not something within the capacity of most African countries." 75 For example, Uruguayan researchers were told by hospital officials that informing patients about their treatment would be logistically difficult and would actually worsen the patients' conditions. 76 Although the Iron Curtain has long ago fallen, "in some countries, prosecutors still enjoy the Stalin-esque power to order detention in a psychiatric institution without prior medical opinion." 77 The literature is robust, and, when read in its entirety, demonstrates certain universal factors in the treatment of those institutionalized because of mental disability: (1) a lack of comprehensive legislation (in some nations, of any legislation) to govern the commitment and treatment of persons with mental disabilities; 78 (2) a lack of independent counsel made available to persons facing commitment and those institutionalized; 79 (3) a failure to provide humane care to institutionalized persons; 80 (4) a lack of coherent and integrated community programs as an alternative to institutional care; 81 and (5) a failure to provide humane services to forensic patients (those whose involvement in the mental health system was triggered by involvement in the criminal justice system).
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What are the implications of all of this for forensic mental health professionals and the forensic mental health professions? To answer this, I will first consider the standards of practice as set out by ethical codes of the APA and the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law. 83 
III. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY'S AND FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY'S NEED TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN THESE ISSUES 84
The APA first published an ethical code in 1953. 85 Since then, it has been regularly revised, and the most recent version was published in 2002. 86 In this version, the principle of "Justice" is included in the "General Principles" section:
Psychologists recognize that fairness and justice entitle all persons to access to and benefit from the contributions of psychology and to equal quality in the processes, procedures, and services being conducted by psychologists. Psychologists exercise reasonable judgment and take precautions to ensure that their potential biases, the boundaries of their competence, and the limitations of their 80 See,  This raises a question we cannot escape: to what extent is this "fairness and justice" principle truly met internationally? 88 In an effort to "improve the quality of forensic psychological services offered to individual clients and the legal system and thereby to enhance forensic psychology as a discipline and profession," 89 the Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists of the APA issued Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists ("Specialty Guidelines") to serve, in part, as "an aspirational model for psychologists acting as experts for [and working in relationship with] the judicial system." 90 The articulated goals of these guidelines are these:
… to improve the quality of forensic psychological services; enhance the practice and facilitate the systematic development of forensic psychology; encourage a high level of quality in professional practice; and encourage forensic practitioners to acknowledge and respect the rights of those they serve. These Guidelines are intended for use by psychologists when engaged in the practice of forensic psychology as described below and may also provide guidance on professional conduct to the legal system, and other organizations and professions.
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These guidelines cover a wide range of behaviors. For example, the guidelines on "Competence" require that:
Forensic psychologists have an obligation to present to the court, regarding the specific matters to which they will testify, the boundaries of their competence, the factual bases (knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) for their qualification as an expert, and the relevance of those factual bases to their qualification 91 SPECIALTY GUIDELINES, supra note 1.
as an expert on the specific matters at issue.
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Guidelines on "Relationships" mandate that:
Forensic psychologists have an obligation to ensure that prospective clients are informed of their legal rights with respect to the anticipated forensic service, of the purposes of any evaluation, of the nature of procedures to be employed, of the intended uses of any product of their services, and of the party who has retained the forensic psychologist.
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Finally, in the "Public and Professional Communications" section, the guidelines emphasize that forensic psychologists must be "aware that their own professional observations, inferences, and conclusions must be distinguished from legal facts, opinions, and conclusions." 94 The Preamble of the far-briefer Guidelines of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law ("AAPL Guidelines") stresses that "[forensic psychiatrists] should be bound by underlying ethical principles of respect for persons, honesty, justice, and social responsibility," 95 and, subsequently, mandates that "[r]espect for the individual's right of privacy and the maintenance of confidentiality should be major concerns when performing forensic evaluations."
96 These guidelines, however, are in no way as detailed or as comprehensive as those drafted by AAPL's psychological counterparts.
In a careful and comprehensive analysis of the forensic mental health assessment procedures, Professor Kirk Heilbrun has identified twenty-nine principles of forensic mental health assessment that he grouped according to whether they were "established" or "emerging."
97 Heilbrun provides us with a carefully established body of proscriptive and prescriptive rules, and it can be said with confidence that these rules apply to all forensic psychologists who are doing such assessments. The empirical question, though, is not answered: do forensic psychologists and psychiatrists follow 92 Specialty Guidelines, supra note 1, at 658. Dr. Harold Hall questions whether it is possible "for psychologists to perform adversarial evaluations and adhere to the Guidelines, EPPCC and the revised testing standards?" E-mail from Dr. Harold Hall to Michael L. Perlin, Professor Emeritus of Law, New York Law School (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). He believes that they can, presuming "mandatory adherence" to the Guidelines, the EPPCC and the revised standards. Id.
93 Specialty Guidelines, supra note 1, at 659. these rules in actual practice? And if no, why not? I believe the reasons for a negative answer (as in so many other areas of law, policy and behavior) can be found in what I refer to as "sanism" and "pretextuality." 98 It is particularly nettlesome to see this sanism and pretextuality in practicing forensic psychologists. If there is any cohort that should be sanism-and pretextuality-free, it should be forensic mental health professionals. Sadly, that has not been the case. 99 I am not entirely pessimistic, however. I believe the solution-or at least a partial solution-can be found in the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. 100 IV. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE For the past twenty-five years, I have been writing incessantly about the malignant impact of sanism and of pretextuality: the two corrosive factors that contaminate all mental disability law. What do these phrases mean? Sanism "is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry." 101 It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. 102 Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and de-individualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" ("OCS") 103 and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process. 104 Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts "accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." 105 This pretextuality is poisonous. It "infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blasé judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying." 106 All aspects of mental disability law are pervaded by sanism and by pretextuality, whether the specific presenting topic is involuntary civil commitment law, right to refuse treatment law, the sexual rights of persons with mental disabilities, or any aspect of the criminal trial process. 107 Together, I believe they help explain the contamination of scholarly discourse and of lawyering practices alike. 108 Unless and until we come to grips with these concepts-and their stranglehold on mental disability law development-any efforts at truly understanding this area of the law, or at understanding the relationship between law and psychology, are doomed to failure. 109 In other works, I have tackled the question of the relationship between sanism and ethics of the forensic mental health professions (specifically, psychology and psychiatry) in the context of clinical evaluations and court testimony. 110 In that context, I argued that, to a great extent, sanism is a disease of attitudes. 111 We generalize about persons with mental disabilities, [VOL. 17:79 stereotype them, typify them, and "slot" their behavior, and by focusing on alleged "'differentness,' we deny their basic humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual needs." 112 When we engage in this generalization, we are doing two things:
[W]e are distancing ourselves from mentally disabled persons-the "them" -and we are simultaneously trying to construct an impregnable borderline between "us" and "them," both to protect ourselves and to dehumanize what Sander Gilman calls "the Other." The label of "sickness" reassures us that "the Other" -seen as "both ill and infectious, both damaged and damaging" not like us and further animates our "keen . . . desire to separate 'us' and 'them. '" 113 There is no longer any question that such attitudes infect decisionmaking by judges and by jurors: 114 on what grounds should we assume that they are somehow strangely absent in the reports and testimony of experts?
Personal bias appears to be "inescapable", unless and until we come to grip with its underlying causes. 115 Dr. Joel Dvoskin has perceptively noted, in this context: "[j]udgments about groups of people can only lead to stigma and discrimination, while judgments about individuals if based on reason and information, can lead to better treatment outcomes and increased safety for the individuals and their communities." 116 The roots of sanism are deep. From the beginning of recorded history, mental illness has been inextricably linked to sin, evil, God's punishment, crime, and demons. 117 Evil spirits were commonly relied upon to explain abnormal behavior. 118 The "face of madness has haunted the imagination of Western man." 119 People with mental illness were considered beasts; a person who lost his capacity to reason was seen as having lost his claim "to be treated as a human being." 120 It goes without saying that this is depressing on multiple levels. Fortunately, I believe there is a remedy that we can embrace. That is one of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past twenty-five plus years-the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ").
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Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation. As a therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. 122 Therapeutic jurisprudence asks whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential without subordinating due process principles. 123 Using TJ, we "look at law as it actually impacts people's lives" 126 and assess law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being. 127 One governing TJ principle is that "law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring about healing and wellness." 128 One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence thus is a commitment to dignity. 129 Therapeutic jurisprudence allows us to gain "a new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications." 130 It has been described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law…a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law…which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism." 131 In doing this, it supports an ethic of care.
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With regard to the three prime ingredients of a therapeutic experience, "three Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness. 133 Professor Amy Ronner argues: what "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 134 After studying the 3Vs in the context of, inter alia, forced drugging of incompetent patients, 135 "scarlet letter" punishments, 136 preventing sex offender recidivism, 137 competence to engage in voluntary sexual interaction, 138 granting individuals with mental disability autonomy in legal decision making, 139 and access to problem-solving courts, 140 I concluded that the adoption of the therapeutic jurisprudence principles set forth above would promote the "true therapeutic process" argued by Professor Ronner. The questions are then: do the behavior of the APA and the continuing inaction of forensic psychologists comport with TJ principles? Does it enhance the likelihood that persons in psychiatric institutions-especially forensic institutions-will be validated, have voice, or feel as if they are acting voluntarily? What, then, can and should forensic psychologists do to remediate this situation? I believe that the answer encompasses requirements on both forensic witnesses and forensic researchers. And the application of international human rights law here-specifically, the CRPD-is entirely consonant with TJ values. 141 I add here a personal note. I litigated for thirteen years before I became a law professor-as a Deputy Public Defender and the Director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy. I spent many years as a law professor, directing a clinic in which our students represented persons with mental and physical disabilities. I have also served as a consultant in many forensic cases. In these contexts, I have dealt with dozens and dozens of expert witnesses in matters involving the rights of persons with mental disabilities in individual and class action cases. 142 I have also done countless site-visits to psychiatric institutions and to institutions for persons with intellectual disabilities domestically and internationally. 143 I have taught forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in my multiple mental disability law courses at New York Law School for over thirty years, and continue to teach them now through continuing education programs. 144 I believe these experiences have given me a relatively comprehensive picture of what psychiatric institutions are like, and how forensic mental health professionals in these facilities work. Beginning with the baseline that "human rights-including the underlying value of autonomy-should inform correctional practice and forensic psychology," 145 these experiences have led me to three major conclusions.
First, I believe that witnesses must take seriously the conditions of the institutions they visit, even if the sole purpose of their visit is to assess committability, competency or insanity. Beyond these examples, I believe that this must be done whether the institution is a civil psychiatric facility, a forensic facility, a jail, or a prison. In coming to their expert conclusions about whether an individual meets the statutory standards for commitment, or whether the individual is competent to stand trial, or whether the individual meets the standards for insanity, or whether the mental status should be raised as a potential mitigating factor in a death penalty case, the witness must consider the impact that institutional conditions have on her ultimate conclusion, and-in the appropriate situation-must address these squarely in her report. My experiences have demonstrated to me that what currently is done by psychologists is insufficient. I thus offer a list of means (by no means exclusive) by which forensic psychologists might ameliorate this state of affairs in a proper way: 146 provide pro bono services 151 to NGOs, disability rights organizations, and other offices that provide legal representation to these populations in systemic law reform litigation, both domestically and internationally. They should also make their services available to groups doing other sorts of institutional law reform. 152 Third, researchers should bore down and focus on the conditions of confinement of forensic patients. Consider the range of issues crying out for greater consideration:
• Evaluation of the proposition that it is more cost-effective for governments to provide for outpatient services rather than keep people unnecessarily institutionalized;
• Evaluation of the proposition that treating people in accordance with the principles espoused by therapeutic jurisprudence-focusing again on Professor Ronner's "three Vs" of voice, validation and voluntariness 153 -will lead to greater treatment adherence on the part of patients, whether they have been committed voluntarily or involuntarily;
• Analysis of the extent to which state and local departments of mental health adhere to U.S. constitutional and statutory law (in the context both of the Americans with Disabilities Act [VOL. 17:79 making reflects the implicit bias 158 of xenophobia in its refusal to acknowledge the relevance of international human rights law to institutional decision-making. 159 I am aware that this is no easy task. Psychologists may be pressured by correctional organizations to engage in practices that violate the APA Ethics Code, in inflicting physical or psychological harm on an offender in the quest to meet organizational requirements for safety and community protection (a schemata in which the organization is the client and the offender is a means to an ends). In such circumstances, the psychologist will have to choose between ethical action (refusing to comply and reporting) or unethical inaction (complying and failing to report). 160 But I believe that international human rights laws demand a different response.
V. CONCLUSION: A CHALLENGE
The revelations of what happened in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib led to a sober and careful examination by organized psychology (and psychiatry) into the role of mental health professionals in certain military operations. The denouement of these revelations led to inquiries into the relationship between what some psychologists and psychiatrists did and international human rights standards. Activists, advocates and scholars have, in recent years, been bringing their focus to bear on the relationship between international human rights and how individuals are treated in psychiatric institutions around the world. Ethical codes mandate that forensic psychologists and forensic psychiatrists behave to ensure that they maximize the values of "fairness and justice" in their dealings with clients. 161 Complicating this entire state of affairs is the contaminating influence of the way that sanism and pretextuality affect professionals' dealings with persons with mental disabilities.
I titled this subsection of my paper "A challenge," because I believe that all of this does present a challenge to concerned psychologists and psychiatrists whose professional work is connected to what goes on in the legal system. It is a challenge because we must remain vigilant in light of the shock-the-conscience state of so many institutions around the world, 162 and because it is essential that mental health professionals involve themselves in efforts to rectify the violations of international human rights law that are omnipresent in so many of those institutions, especially in those cases where being passive about those violations also violates ethical codes.
The disclosures of what happened at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib have opened a window that will not, and cannot, be closed. 163 But, I believe we can learn from our mistakes, and take that knowledge and apply it to the issue that is the centerpiece of this paper: the need for organized psychology-especially forensic psychology-to embrace international human rights requirements applicable to the institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities, especially forensic patients. 164 In doing so, organized psychology will take a major step in "strip[ping] bare the sanist façade" 165 of the institutions. The critic Paul Williams calls The Times They Are A-Changin' a song that is "generous, evangelical, eager to share the truth with the whole world." 166 The line that I chose to begin the title of this paper-"Your Old Road Is/ Rapidly Agin'"-was a challenge by the then twenty-two-year-old Dylan to authority figures at all levels of society, a challenge he issued in 1963, at one of the most tumultuous times of American history. We face a time of challenge and tumult now. I believe that if we heed Dylan's challenge, we will be taking a major step in the right direction down a new road. 
